In this paper, we explore the linkage between two related concepts describing an individual's attitude towards risk, namely, financial risk tolerance (FRT) and risk aversion. The former is measured from survey data and the latter from data from lottery experiments. Specifically, we follow a two stage process: (1) we obtain FRT scores from a psychometrically-validated survey on a sample of 162 people; and (2) we conduct a battery of lottery choice experiments on the same people. The second stage is primarily distinguished from earlier lottery choice experiments by being online and involving non-student subjects. Moreover, we contrast: real and hypothetical payoffs; low and high stake payoffs; decisions involving gains and losses; and order effects. Our key finding is that the two approaches to analysing decision-making under uncertainty are strongly aligned. We present evidence that this is particularly the case for the female participants in our sample. There is also some evidence that the alignment is strengthened when high stake gambles are employed. In this paper, we explore the linkage between two related concepts describing an individual's attitude towards risk, namely, financial risk tolerance (FRT) and risk aversion. The former is measured from survey data and the latter from data from lottery experiments. Specifically, we follow a two stage process: (1) we obtain FRT scores from a psychometrically-validated survey on a sample of 162 people; and (2) we conduct a battery of lottery choice experiments on the same people. The second stage is primarily distinguished from earlier lottery choice experiments by being online and involving non-student subjects. Moreover, we contrast: real and hypothetical payoffs; low and high stake payoffs; decisions involving gains and losses; and order effects. Our key finding is that the two approaches to analysing decision-making under uncertainty are strongly aligned. We present evidence that this is particularly the case for the female participants in our sample. There is also some evidence that the alignment is strengthened when high stake gambles are employed.
I. Introduction
In this paper we bridge two literatures on the attitude to economic/financial risk: financial risk tolerance (FRT) and risk aversion (RA); in an attempt to see how well they complement/reinforce each other. Integration of FRT and RA has never been done before and it offers the realistic prospect of unique insights into both literatures. 1 FRT refers to an investor's attitude towards risk -the amount of uncertainty or investment return volatility that an investor is willing to accept when making a financial decision (Grable, 2000) . In concept,
FRT is inversely related to the economists' notion of risk aversion. That is, individuals who are more (less) risk averse will have a lower (higher) tolerance for financial risk.
In the extant literature, there are three methods for measuring FRT/RA: observing actual investment behavior, assessing choices in an experimental setting, and creating scores from survey questionnaires. For example, Schooley and Worden (1996) infer RA from portfolio allocations and Cohen and Einav (2005) structurally estimate risk aversion using car insurance data. There is also a growing body of literature that analyses contestant behaviors on gameshows. 2 In assessing choices in an experimental setting, researchers consider either hypothetical scenarios or where decisions have financial consequences (see, for example, Barsky et al., 1997; Laury, 2002 and 2005; . Finally, researchers such as Grable and Lytton (1999) and Hallahan et al. (2004) investigate demographic patterns in FRT scores.
1 We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this unique focus. 2 Of very recent times there has been considerable activity focusing on the show, Deal or No Deal, which has numerous franchises worldwide. See, for example, Andersen et al. (2006b, c and d) , Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) ; Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006a and b) ; de Roos and Serafidis (2006) ; Post et al. (2006); and Mulino et al. (2006) .
With regard to the FRT literature, there is considerable interest in the demographic 'determinants' and attention is particularly focused on age, gender, education, income/wealth and marital status. 3 Specifically, while debate still remains on some issues, a range of common findings are generally observed. First, FRT decreases with age (see, for example, McInish, 1982; Morin and Suarez, 1983; and Palsson, 1996) . Second, females have a lower preference for risk than males (see, for example, Palsson, 1996; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Powell and Ansic, 1997; and Grable, 2000) . 4 Third, FRT increases with education (see, for example, Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995) . Fourth, FRT increases with income and wealth (see, for example, Friedman, 1974; Cohn et al., 1975; Shaw, 1996; and Bernheim et al., 2001 ). Fifth, single (i.e. unmarried) investors are more risk tolerant (see, for example, Roszkowski, et al., 1993) .
Recently, Holt and Laury (2002) investigate RA in the context of lottery choice decisions. Specifically, they address the "incentive effects" issue by having their experimental group of subjects (students) engage in both hypothetical and real lottery games. 5 They examine the effects of payoff magnitudes in an experiment where people have to choose between a range of matched pairs of 'safe' and 'risky' gambles. 6 Holt and Laury find that the size of the payoff matters, with RA increasing as the stakes involved grow. They also find that people exhibit higher levels of risk aversion in hypothetical choices as compared to choices involving real monetary stakes. A key implication is that "... contrary to Kahneman and Tversky's supposition, subjects facing hypothetical choices cannot imagine how they would actually behave under high-incentive conditions" Laury, 2002, p. 1654 ).
As outlined above, there are two related literatures (FRT and RA) , that hitherto have not been compared before, thus providing us an opportunity for a unique methodological contribution to the literature. The primary goal of our paper is to perform such integration.
Specifically, we select a group of experimental subjects who follow a two stage process. In the first stage, they complete a full psychometrically-based FRT survey which produces a risk tolerance score for each individual. Then in the second stage, they play a range of lottery choice games with both hypothetical and real payoffs (modeled on the Holt and Laury, 2002, design) .
Our experimental setup produces a range of key elements relative to the existing literature. First, our analysis gives important insights into whether and to what extent the FRT and risk aversion approaches are compatible. Second, compared to Holt and Laury we have higher stakes and engage more subjects into such games. Third, we include some rounds of play in which negative outcomes ('loss making') occur, thereby allowing us to draw some inferences regarding loss aversion and prospect theory. 7 Fourth, unlike many other similar studies we do not use students as subjects. This has the major advantage of giving a more representative sample of society, including a broader range of education levels, age and wealth. A final feature is that we implement our lottery experiment using an online web-based delivery.
Our major findings are easily summarized as follows. Our central result is that obtaining a financial risk tolerance score from a psychometrically-validated survey versus the risk aversion type of information deduced from lottery choice experiments are indeed strongly correlated. Our evidence suggests that this is particularly the case for females. There is also some suggestion that the FRT-RA linkage is strengthened when high stake gambles are employed.
7 See Laury and Holt (2005) who find a difference in risk attitudes between losses and gains.
II. Research Design and Implementation
There are two key elements to our basic research design. First, all subjects completed a full psychometrically-validated FRT survey which produced a risk tolerance score for each of them. Second, all subjects play a range of lottery choice games with both hypothetical and real payoffs. Details of each element and how they relate to each other are presented in the following sections.
FRT Survey Element
The use of subjective survey questionnaires is a widely accepted method for assessing FRT.
Because of the complexity of the attitudinal construct, a sophisticated psychological testing instrument is required (Callan and Johnson, 2003) . A good attitudinal test will meet accepted psychological standards for both face validity (perceived relevance of the questions) and predictive validity (prediction of later performance or behavior). It will also have reliability The scale is normally distributed with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. 10 The metric has been subject to usability, reliability and norming trials by the University of NSW, exceeding international psychometric standards (web site: http://www.risk-profiling.com/).
2002. It can be completed in hard-copy form or accessed through the Internet. Our project utilizes a database of these FRT scores and associated demographic data.
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We contacted FinaMetrica in early 2005 seeking their assistance in obtaining a sample of subjects for our experiment. FinaMetrica initially identified a pool exceeding 1000 people who had recently completed their FRT survey (and also a range of demographic questions).
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From this group, a subset of approximately 600 participants had answered 'yes' to a question administered with the original survey asking whether they would be willing to participate in follow up surveys relating to financial risk tolerance and attitudes to investing. Our contact at FinaMetrica kindly agreed to email these 600 people asking if they would be specifically interested in taking part in our experiment (see the Appendix for a transcript of the email communication). From this group, 250 individuals indicated that they would be willing to participate and, thus, this subset became the target for our stage 2 lottery experiment.
Lottery Choice Experiment
From the potential pool of 250, 162 people completed the lottery experiment. The big advantage of this sample compared to many other studies is that we do not rely on students.
The participants in our experiment represent a much broader spectrum of society in many dimensions including age; wealth; and life experience. 13 The setup for this experiment is explained below.
11 Accompanying the risk tolerance test is a set of eight demographic questions dealing with age, gender, postcode (zipcode), education, income, marital status, financial dependents and net assets. 12 It should be noted that we followed a very lengthy process to obtain full and proper ethical clearance for our project from the ethics committee at our university. As part of that process we agreed to fully respect the confidentiality of all participants. 13 Holt and Laury's (2002) sample of 175 subjects is made up of (a) undergraduates; (b) MBA students and (c) business school faculty.
While we apply Holt and Laury's (2002) basic lottery choice design, in contrast to them we create a completely web-based online experiment. 14 This has advantages and disadvantages. 15 The experiment comprises a series of "rounds", with each round involving 10 choices between separate pair-wise lotteries. An example of an illustrative round is presented in Figure 1 as a "computer screen" view in the web-based format that confronts the participants. As shown in the figure, Option A represents the safer gamble with a high payoff of $60 and a low payoff of $48, 16 whereas Option B represents the riskier gamble with a high payoff of $115.50 and a low payoff of $3. Decision 1 in this case, gives a 10% (90%) chance of the high (low) payoff. For each successive increment down the list, the chance of the high (low) payoff increases (decreases) by 10% until Decision 10 is reached in which case the high payoff is fully certain.
After the participant has recorded their choices for a complete round of 10 decisions, that particular round is completed and the lottery choice program moves on to ascertain the "outcome" for that participant. The outcome for each round (revealed to each player at the end of each round prior to starting the next round) is determined by a two stage process. In step 1 a notional 10-sided die is rolled and the number "revealed" identifies which decision is "alive". For example, if the electronic die roll reveals a '7' then it is Decision 7 which is "alive".
Step 2 involves a second roll of the notional die and the number which comes up identifies whether a high or low win has occurred. For example, if the second die roll for 14 Full details of how we implement the online experiment are suppressed to conserve space. Suffice it to say, a number of difficulties were encountered and resolved. For example, we needed to design the experiment such that participants could not "cheat". As a result, two important features were that unique IDs were assigned to each player (password protected) and second we ensured that a real time permanent record of each completed round was made in the database such that a participant could not try and replay a round in the hope of being luckier and winning a larger prize. Holt and Laury (2005) used a computer interface (unlike Holt and Laury, 2002) , however, the researcher was present during the experiment and conducted the dice throw by hand. 15 One disadvantage of running the experiment in an online format via email is that a number of participants queried whether the experiment was an internet "scam". Indeed, one participant contacted an official of our university (independent of our project) to report us as possibly running some scamming operation "legitimized" under the university's "banner". 16 All amounts are paid in Australian dollars. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was approximately, AU$1 = US$0.75.
Decision 7 comes up a '2' ('9'), then the participant has won either $60 ($48) if they had chosen Option A or $115.50 ($3) if they had chosen Option B.
Each participant plays between three and six rounds depending on the scenarios encountered, which will be explained shortly. We designed rounds to vary along a range of dimensions. First, is stakes -there is a "low" and a "high" case scenario. In the low case scenario winnings range between $0.10 and $3.85, while the high case scenario winnings range between $3 and $577.50. Second, is real versus hypothetical rounds. Each round is clearly designated as being either "real" (and therefore impacting actual money that the participant will receive) or "hypothetical" (which has no bearing on actual winnings). Third, is gain versus loss rounds. A gain round involves choice between two positive payoffs, whereas a loss round involves choice between two negative payoffs.
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There is a maximum of 6 rounds that any participant can play and we list the sequence of such rounds in Panel A of Table 1 . Round 1 is a low payoff ('1x'), gain and real round. Table 1 shows the payoff schedule for the two low rounds (Rounds 1 and 6). The risky (safe) option produces a "good" outcome of $3.85 ($2) and a "bad" outcome of $0.10 ($1.60).
The reality of running experiments such as ours is the existence of a binding (relatively low) budget constraint and the challenge is to balance the myriad of competing issues to arrive at what is seen as the optimal research design. With this in mind, we decided to "stream" participants into three different high payoff rounds. The highest payoff we were able to justify was $577.50, but due to budget constraints we couldn't allow this to be available to any more than about 40 players. Panel C of Table 1 outlines the three streams that we use. For the gain rounds, Stream 1 corresponds to a '30x' game; Stream 2 a '78x' game and Stream 3 a '150x' game. As revealed in this table, we need to ensure that the high loss rounds (Rounds 4 and 5) appropriately "matched" their high gain round counterparts so that the possibility of "bankruptcy" is eliminated. Indeed, participants who won the lowest amount in Round 3 automatically bypass Rounds 4 and 5 -they are instead directed straight through to Round 6. 18 We summarize the four possible sequences of play in Panel D of Table 1 -note that 3 (6) rounds are the minimum (maximum) played.
The potential confounding of "order effects" is an issue that receives some attention in the literature (see, for example, . As Harrison et al. (2005, p. 897) states, an " … order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task." We implement two forms of control to counter-balance order effects in our experiment. One half of the participants start in Round 1 (with a real, low payoff scenario), while the others skip Round 1 and start in Round 2 (with an hypothetical, high payoff scenario). We also ensure that one half of the participants are presented with "Option A" as the risky option, while the other half are presented with "Option B" as the risky option ("Option A" is always listed first).
III. Discussion of Experimental Issues
Harrison and List (2004) propose a taxonomy of experiments that includes: conventional lab experiments; artefactual lab experiments; framed field experiments; and natural field experiments. Artefactual field experiments differ from conventional lab experiments in that they use a non-standard subject pool. A framed field experiment is an artefactual experiment with a field context in either the commodity task or information set that contestants can use.
Finally, a natural field experiment is the same as a framed field experiment except the environment is one where subjects naturally undertake the tasks that are the subject of the experiment and the subjects do not know that they are in an experiment.
In terms of the parameters of the taxonomy set out above, our experiment differs from a traditional lab experiment in two important respects. First, we use non-students. According to Harrison and List (2004) , this would be a sufficient innovation to move it into the "artefactual field experiment" category. Second, our experiment is conducted online. While still an artificial environment in some respects, it reflects a setting in which many people regularly undertake commercial transactions today. This is likely to be true for at least some of the people in our sample, who are informed about the experiment and volunteer for it online. Our experiment would not fall within the definition of a "natural field experiment" as set out by Harrison and List, since our participants are aware that they are taking part in an experiment, but it is nonetheless important to note that the environment in which they make their decisions is not the same as a conventional lab experiment.
Artefactual Field Experiments
Laboratory experiments in economics are often criticized for relying almost exclusively on students as subjects. One of the key issues in this debate is whether students are somehow unrepresentative of the broader population -or rather, whether they are representative, but simply exhibit less variance in certain demographic characteristics such as age and income. If the latter is true, then it may be possible (though likely quite difficult) to extrapolate from findings about students by using whatever variance exists. 19 If the former is true, then it may be necessary to take account of selection bias in some other fashion.
Potential Selection Bias
Selection bias could arise in at least two ways. First, people might self-select into being a student. This could be observed via a comparison of relevant demographic traits across the overall population and the student population. A second bias might arise in the recruitment process in terms of the types of students who are most likely to respond to the advertisements and announcements that induce people to take part in experiments. Some field experiments avoid the second type of bias (for example, "natural experiments"). In such instances, the only bias will be via selection into the group that is being studied in its natural environment. One example of such an experiment is undertaken by Camerer (1998) , who studies bookmakers in their natural environment.
Our experiment, even though arguably conducted in a field setting, certainly has both biases. Our participants self-select into the pool from which we draw our sample by becoming connected in some way with FinaMetrica. Among other things, one would expect them to be wealthier, better educated, more interested in wealth creation and more knowledgeable about financial transactions than the average person. Participants in our experiment, like student participants in conventional laboratory experiments, also self-select via the volunteering process. As in conventional laboratory experiments, we do not correct for this potential bias.
As List (2004, p. 1017) note, "… some field experiments face a more serious problem of sample selection that depends on the nature of the task. Once the experiment has begun, it is not as easy as it is in the lab to control information flow about the nature of the task. This is obviously a matter of degree, but can lead to endogenous subject attrition from the experiment." Since our experiment is conducted online, we find it difficult to control the information flow and, as a result, we have to rely upon highly detailed instructions to make sure that we cover off on the most likely areas of confusion. However, we are fortunate in that there is almost no attrition in our experiment. Of those who volunteered to take part and emailed us requesting a login identity, all but a very small number fully completed the experiment.
A final issue in relation to selection bias runs in somewhat the opposite direction.
Specifically, certain tasks in the real world may be performed by a very narrow set of people, making it difficult to extrapolate how such people will behave based on people randomly chosen for an experiment. 20 For example, there may be certain tasks which are subject to extreme self-selection in the real world, such as risk-loving people being attracted to become traders. This may be reinforced as people without the necessary aptitude and/or preferences are subjected to attrition over time. Moreover, people involved in certain real world tasks may develop skills and behavioral characteristics over time via experience: a process that is usually very difficult to replicate in time-constrained experiments. These are important considerations when extrapolating from an experiment to the broader world. However, we believe that the tasks being performed in this experiment are sufficiently generic and straightforward that this type of bias should not be a problem.
Are Students Different?
Many studies contrast student samples with non-student samples. For example, Harrison and Lesley (1996) explore whether it is possible to obtain similar results in a survey of students at 20 For a discussion of the large literature dealing with the role of experience and endogenous institutional design in relation to behavioral defects, see Harrison (2005) , Levitt and List (2006, especially pp. 33-38) and Botelho et al. (2007) .
the University of South Carolina to those collected using a major national survey. They find that the student survey, when re-weighted to reflect the U.S. population, produces very accurate estimates of damage valuations. This study suggests that it is limited variance in the demographic characteristics of students (which can usually be corrected for, at least to some degree), rather than something inherent in the nature of students per se, that makes students different from the overall population.
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Nature of the Task
Another important question is whether the nature of the task is too abstract or lacking in field references for the subjects to fully comprehend what is being asked of them. 22 This could be particularly problematic in our setting given that the experiment is run online and there is relatively little opportunity for contestants to ask questions. 23 However, the nature of our experiment is such that we are confident that people have adequate reference points: or "field referents". The instructions are very detailed and included a number of trial runs. In particular, it is worth noting that the choices that people make are over dollars, rather than an abstract unit of measurement such as tickets or points. Moreover, we attempt to make the randomization process as transparent as possible and use examples and trials before the experiment proper, to increase subjects' understanding.
Size of the Stakes
Many argue that the behavior of participants in laboratory experiments involving small stakes may not reflect their behavior in real world situations involving much higher stakes. One 21 A number of other studies examine non-students. For example, Haigh and List (2005) and Alevy et al. (2007) focus on professional CBOT traders, while 2006) analyze a representative sample of Danish people. 22 Dyer and Kagel (1996) touch on this issue and find that a rule of thumb used by executives in the commercial construction industry to avoid the winners' curse does not translate to the laboratory. 23 Subjects in our experimental setting could submit queries via email -and in some cases they did so.
response to this criticism has been to raise the dollar value of the stakes. Examples include, Holt and Laury (2002) ; List and Cherry (2005); and Carpenter et al (2005) . This is the approach that we adopt.
24
Hypothetical Stakes
A large experimental literature exists demonstrating that there are differences in the decisions which people make when there are real financial consequences as opposed to decisions of a hypothetical nature. 25 Holt and Laury (2002) find that subjects in a lottery choice experiment display lower levels of risk aversion where the choices are hypothetical, as opposed to choices with real monetary consequences. Similarly, Cameron (1999) finds that Proposer behavior displays greater variance and Responders are significantly more likely to reject offers when games involved hypothetical stakes. Our experiment contrasts lottery choices with both real and hypothetical stakes, broadly supporting the findings of these earlier studies.
The Environment of the Field Study
Most laboratory experiments seek to create an environment that controls for all external stimuli other than the specific subject under study. Given that we conduct our experiment online, we effectively have no control over the environment in which our subjects participate.
This need not be a problem. In fact, it could be an advantage. Harrison and List (2004) and Levitt and List (2006) summarize an extensive literature examining the potential for the artificiality and formality of the laboratory environment to affect people's decision-making.
In addition to the laboratory setting itself being an issue, the mere knowledge of being 24 A less costly alternative is to take moderate stakes experiments to participants in low income countries, thereby dramatically increasing the value of the stakes as a proportion of participants' income or wealth. Examples include Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) in China, Slonim and Roth (1998) in the Slovak Republic and Cameron (1999) in Indonesia. 25 For a survey of this literature, see Harrison (2006) . observed may also affect subject behavior (see Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2006, especially pp. 15-18) .
In our experiment, many subjects are very aware that they are being observed. Some emailed us after the experiment indicating what they thought our "expectations" are and whether or not they felt that they had behaved consistently with those expectations. Some indicated that they had tried to answer questions "properly" -even though our instructions clearly state that there is no "correct" answer.
We believe that the environment in which our participants make their choices arguably reduce these effects. It is, for many of the participants, an environment in which they ordinarily undertake commercial transactions -i.e. on their home or work computer. As such, the environment may have reduced some subjects' feeling of being observed while they made their choices.
26
IV. Empirical Analysis
Sample Descriptives
As indicated earlier, our final sample comprises 162 participants, which represents a response rate of about 65% from the group which had initially indicated that they would be willing to play the lottery game. Table 2 provides a set of summary information regarding our sample.
Panel A provides overall figures and several observations are worthy of note. First, clearly our sample is dominated by males (83%) -that is, there are only 28 females out of the 162 participants. Second, we see that the vast majority of the survey respondents are married (98%). Third, the average age in our sample is 50 years, with a minimum age of 20 through to a maximum age of 73. As such, while our sample is slightly skewed toward older people, it is 26 On the other hand, people taking part in an online experiment may have felt that every keystroke they made was being timed and recorded, which may have increased the extent of self-consciousness.
more "age-representative" than many other previous lottery choice experiments. Fourth, the sample is very highly educated with an average score of 3.58 (a value of '4' is the maximum education category and indicates that the person has completed a university degree or higher qualification).
Fifth, we observe that the average wealth (income) per person 27 of our sample is approximately $400,000 ($30,000). Notably, we have quite a wide divergence of financial wellbeing with some respondents claiming wealth exceeding $2million, while others nominate close to zero wealth. Sixth, in terms of the FRT score the average is 65, with a minimum of 38 and a maximum of 89. This diversity in assessed risk tolerance is very important since it gives confidence that our testing should have good power. Finally, we see that the average prize won is $134, with a maximum of $579.20 down to a low of $4.60.
Indeed, it is worthy of note that the total (real) dollar prize pool for our experiment is approximately $22,000.
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In Panel B of Table 2 , we report some further summary statistics classified by type of game, in which we partition games into "low" (Stream 1, as characterized in Table 1 );
"medium" (Stream 2) and "high" (Stream 3). First, we observe that just over half the participants played the "low" game type, while the remaining people are pretty evenly split between the medium and high game types. Second, the total rounds played are 860, with over half coming from the "low" game type. Finally, we see that the average winnings in the "high" game type scenario is almost 6 times the average for the "low" game type. 27 We define wealth or income 'per person' as the respondent's personal wealth or income divided by 1 plus the number of financial dependents for which that person is responsible. 28 While we recognize that our sample is not fully representative of the population, it is much closer to this ideal than studies which rely exclusively on student subjects. Moreover, we argue that it represents those in society who are likely to seek professional investment and personal financial planning advice.
Preliminary Univariate Analysis
By way of preliminary analysis we first consider if any basic unconditional patterns exist.
Specifically, we analyze the number of "safe" option choices selected by each player, each round (NSafe) and calculate mean values per round. 29 NSafe is taken to be a simple and intuitive "index" of risk aversion. Table 3 reports the outcome of such univariate comparisons in which games are classified into "low"; "medium" and "high" cases, as above. Panel A first reports some overall figures and we observe three main things.
First, there appear to be scale effects between rounds but not across streams. The mean number of safe choices in Rounds 1 and 6 are virtually identical both in the overall sample and within each stream. The number of safe choices in Rounds 2 and 3 (hypothetical and real 'high' rounds, respectively) are higher. In the overall sample, the mean number of safe choices in Round 3 is statistically higher than the mean number of safe choices in Round 6 (with a p-value of 0.013). 30 Moreover, the mean number of safe choices in Rounds 2 and 3 are higher than in either Round 1 or Round 6 for each individual stream. Given the small sample sizes, most of these differences are not statistically significant (although for Stream 3, the difference between Round 3 and Round 6 has a p-value of 0.059). This corroborates Holt and Laury's (2002) finding that moving from a low payoff to a high payoff round of play increases people's risk aversion.
In contrast, we do not find a difference across streams. The mean number of safe choices in Round 3 is approximately equal in Streams 1 and 3 (and, somewhat surprisingly, higher in Stream 2). In Round 2 (hypothetical high stakes) the mean number of safe choices declines between Stream 1 and Stream 2.
29 While there are 10 games per round, the maximum rational score of "safe" choices is 9 since Decision 10 is always a choice between two certain outcomes (refer to Figure 1 for an illustrative case) and in that setting the option designated as "risky", having the higher (certain) payoff, is preferred. 30 We compare Rounds 3 and 6 since only half of the participants took part in Round 1 (Rounds 1 and 6 are substitutes since they both involved low real choices).
Together, these two results suggest that people behave differently in a gamble with an expected value of $2 versus a gamble with an expected value in the range $50-$300 (i.e. small versus high stakes gambles). However, people do not see a material difference between the various high stakes gambles. The first finding is not surprising, and accords both with hypothetical and real stakes experiments to date. The second finding may be an insight attributable to the fact that we are not using students as subjects. "Adults" may notice the difference between a "trivial" gamble of $2-$5 and a more substantial gamble of $50 or more.
But someone with higher income and/or wealth and more life experience may not distinguish between $50 and $300 to the same extent that a typical student would.
A second observation from Panel A is that there is no compelling evidence of a "loss aversion" effect based on the overall univariate results -comparisons between gain and loss rounds reveal nothing statistically significant. Third, comparisons between real and hypothetical lotteries also show no signs of statistical difference (although, in the overall sample and two of the three streams, participants make more safe choices, on average, in the real rounds than in the hypothetical rounds). Table 3 reports the same univariate information partitioned by gender.
Panel B of
Interestingly, these results suggest that a gender "effect" exists -generally, females are more risk averse, showing a tendency to take a higher number of safe options on average.
Specifically, females choose more safe options overall (5.67 versus 5.29), which seems to be largely driven by the "high" stream sub-sample -thus suggesting that the females in our sample are more susceptible to a "scale" effect. Indeed, when we consider the round-by-round analysis, it is the high (gain) rounds (Rounds 2 and 3) in which some further significant gender differences are revealed. 31 For example, in the high stream of Round 2, females choose on average of 6.63 safe lotteries whereas the counterpart males only choose 5.38. Similarly, when we go to the high real gain round (Round 3), overall, females average 6.04 versus 5.38 safe choices by males. As a final comment on the gender effect in Panel B, it is notable that 14 out of a possible 18 cases in the disaggregated rounds analysis show a higher average safe choice by females. Such a ratio is statistically significant based on a non-parametric "sign"
test.
Multivariate Analysis of Demographic Factors -Number of Safe Choices in Lottery Games versus FRT
As outlined earlier, there is a considerable literature that tests the determinants of risk tolerance, in terms of different demographic data. Accordingly, we begin our main analysis by estimating a model specified as: 32 We accommodate potential non-linearity of age in light of previous evidence see, for example, Riley and Chow (1992) and Bajtelsmit and VanDerhai (1997) . 33 The original income and wealth data that are recorded by FinaMetrica provided for ranges of values rather than specific values. The specific question in relation to income is: "Having in mind income from all sourceswork, investment, family and government -my personal before-tax income is …", with 5 answer categories available. The specific question in relation to wealth is: "Think of your net assets as being what you own, including your family home and other personal-use assets, minus what you owe. Into which bracket does the value of your net assets fall? ( If you are married or have a de facto partner, include your share of jointly owned assets )", with 10 answer categories available. We converted these ranges to specific values by taking the midpoint and dividing through by the number of family dependents. In the case of the maximum categories of income (> $200,000) and net assets (> $2million), we arbitrarily apply $250,000 and $4million, respectively. is married (legally or defacto) and zero otherwise. NDep is the number of people in the family whom are financially dependent on the respondent. Finally, Edu is an ordered categorical variable representing the educational background of the participant, 1 (4) representing the minimum (maximum) education level.
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We report the estimated regression results in Panel A of Palsson, 1996; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Powell and Ansic, 1997; and Grable, 2000) . Third, we uncover a nonlinear impact for Age -the linear term is negative, while the quadratic term is positive. This indicates a convex linkage suggesting that both younger and older people tend to be more risk tolerant, while people in the "middle" age bracket are less risk tolerant (i.e. more risk averse).
This finding is in line with the non-linear role of age reported by Riley and Chow (1992) , Bajtelsmit and VanDerhai (1997) and .
Fourth, we find that the coefficient on income is positive suggesting that higher income people are more willing to bear financial risk (see, for example, Friedman, 1974; Cohn et al., 1975; Riley and Chow, 1992; and Shaw, 1996) . Fifth, we find that being married tends to reduce FRT -however, given the overwhelming dominance of married people in our sample, this result needs to be treated with caution. Sixth, NDep has a positive coefficient indicating that a respondent with more family dependents will have a higher tolerance for risk.
In sum, the strength of the collective results for this FRT regression gives us great confidence to proceed on to examine our main research question.
The primary focus of this paper is to examine how well the FRT score produced from a psychometric-validated attitude test aligns with indications of risk aversion inferred from a lottery experimental framework. Accordingly, to allow an initial assessment of this research question, we also conduct regressions with NSafe (the number of safe choices made in each round by each participant in the lottery choice experiment) as the dependent variable: In the event that FRT and NSAfe are compatible measures, we would expect that the same explanatory variables produce statistically significant coefficients, but of opposite sign (given their reciprocal nature).
We outline the results of these regressions in Panel B of Table 4 . We run three sets of regressions: for the low gain rounds; for the high gain rounds; and for the loss rounds. The most notable finding is that statistically significant results occur for most of the demographic determinants in the high gain rounds but not for the low gain rounds or the loss rounds.
Moreover, for the high gain rounds regression the sign of the coefficients on DFem, Age, Age 2 and DMarr are as expected and consistent with the counterpart FRT regression of Panel A. 35 It seems that the demographic determinants of risk aversion are difficult to ascertain with very low stakes gambles -at least where the participants are adults earning moderate to high incomes. Taken together, our Table 4 results suggest that FRT and NSafe are particularly compatible when the stakes of the lottery experiment are high.
Direct Assessment of the Linkage between NSafe and FRT
As a final set of analysis to explore the robustness of our key finding, we run a series of regressions between NSafe and FRT. As a baseline case we estimate the simple regression as follows:
The basic prediction is that the slope coefficient will be negative and significant.
In addition, we extend the model in equation (3) where the new variables are defined as follows. DUni is a dummy variable taking a value of unity if the subject has a university or higher degree qualification and zero otherwise. DLow (DHigh) is a dummy variable taking a value of unity if the round is a low (high) stakes round, i.e. Rounds 1 or 6, (Rounds 2 to 5) and zero otherwise. Di (i = R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6) is a dummy variable taking a value of unity if the round is Round j and zero otherwise. Our primary focus in these equations is on the sign/significance of the coefficient associated with each interaction term -they are all predicted to be negative.
We present the results for the estimated beta coefficient in equation (3) and for the interaction terms in the remaining models, in Panels A to E of Table 5 . The salient points arising from these estimations are as follows. First, in Panel A we see that as expected the overall (unconditional) relation between NSafe and FRT is significantly negative (at the 1% level). As such, we have immediate confirming evidence of our central hypothesis. Second, in Panel B we observe that the Female FRT coefficient is considerably more negative than its male counterpart: -0.0545 versus -0.0193. Indeed, the Wald test of equality is rejected (at the 5% level). This finding suggests that the females in our sample exhibit a much tighter correspondence between the NSafe and FRT indicators of risk attitude.
Third, Panel C reveals that participants with a university education are much more likely to produce a consistency between NSafe and FRT. While the formal Wald test fails to reinforce this conclusion, it is an interesting "education" result nevertheless. Fourth, we see in Panel D that high stake rounds dominate with a strongly negative estimated coefficient (at the 1% level). While the low stakes and loss rounds also produce negative coefficient estimates, it is only the latter that achieves any form of significance (at the 10% level). Despite observing differences in the individual estimated coefficients, the Wald test fails to reject equality for the high, low and loss round coefficients. Fifth, in Panel E we see that it is Rounds 2, 3 and 4 which are the drivers of the negative NSafe-FRT relation -particularly, the first high stakes case of Round 2 (which is individually significant at the 1% level). However, once more the overall joint test of equality across rounds cannot be rejected.
Finally, in Panel F of Table 5 we report a range of pair-wise tests of equality relating to the estimated version of equation (7) 
V. Conclusion
The financial risk tolerance and risk aversion literatures study similar, although potentially distinguishable aspects of decision-making under uncertainty. By conducting a lottery choice experiment composed entirely of people who had previously completed a psychometricallyvalidated FRT survey, we have been able to link these literatures.
We find that FRT and risk aversion are indeed closely aligned. A person's FRT score is an important "predictor" of their behavior in the lottery-choice experiment. Moreover, we have been able to identify/confirm important demographic determinants of both FRT and risk aversion and, importantly, we present evidence that these demographic determinants are largely consistent across these two measures. We also document some evidence that the NSafe-FRT linkage is stronger for females; when larger stakes are involved and for more highly educated subjects.
Consistent with earlier studies, we also find that women tend to be more risk averse (and less tolerant of financial risk) than males. In addition, we observe that risk aversion and ; Wealth, net assets of the participant including the family home and other personal-use assets, minus any amounts owed adjusted for number of dependents; Income, average income per person; DMarr, a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the respondent is married and zero if unmarried; NDep, the number of people in the family whom are financially dependent on the participant; and Edu, an ordered categorical variable representing the educational background of the participant, 1 -did not complete high school; 2 -completed high school; 3 -completed a trade or diploma qualification and 4 -completed a university degree or higher qualification. Panel B reports a similar regression to Panel A except that the dependent variable is now NSafe, the number of "Safe" options chosen by the participant in each round of the lottery choice experiment. The independent variables are identical to those used in the Panel A regression. Panel B has three variations of its regression in which observations are partitioned based on the type of round as follows: (a) Low gain rounds -Rounds 1 and 6; (b) High gain rounds -Rounds 2 and 3; and (c) Loss rounds -Rounds 4 and 5. White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance are used. Note that the reported coefficients on the Wealth and Income variables are scaled up by a factor of 1000 to aid readability. 
